



Abstract—Modern Systems are usually obtained as incremental 
composition of proper (smaller and SMART) subsystems interacting 
through communication interfaces. Such flexible architecture allows 
the pervasive provisioning of a wide class of services, ranging from 
multimedia contents delivery, through monitoring data collection, to 
command and control functionalities. All these services requires that 
the adequate level of robustness and security is assured at End-to-
End (E2E) level, according to user requirements that may vary 
depending on the specific context or the involved technologies. A 
flexible methodology to dynamically control the security level of the 
service being offered is then needed. In this perspective, the authors 
propose an innovative control architecture able to assure E2E 
security potentially in any application, by dynamically adapting to the 
underlying systems and using its resources to “build the security”. In 
particular, the main novelties of this solution are: i) the possibility of 
dynamically discovering and composing the available functionalities 
offered by the environment to satisfy the security needs and ii) the 
possibility of modelling and measuring the security through 
innovative technology-independent metrics. The results presented in 
this paper moves from the solutions identified in the pSHIELD 
project and enrich them with the innovative advances achieved 
through the nSHIELD research, still ongoing. Both projects have 
been funded by ARTEMIS-JU. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
ECHNOLOGICAL advances in computational capabilities 
along with improvement in communication technologies 
have enriched the market with a new class of SMART devices 
that can be used in every application domain, ranging from 
entertainment, trough automotive and manufacturing, to energy 
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or health.  
These devices (i.e. sensor nodes, SMART actuators, 
programmable controllers, small computing platform, etc.) are  
commonly referred to as Embedded Devices or Embedded 
Systems (ESs) and their peculiarities are: i) a reduced size, ii) 
the possibility of implementing specific functionalities with 
limited resources and iii) the possibility of interconnecting 
with other devices to create more complex systems. 
Leveraging these peculiarities, several industrial domains have 
started to massively deploy ESs networks to realize a plenty of 
tasks, no longer limited to a specific functionality but extended 
up to end-to-end behaviors.  
In order to drive the European research towards an 
improvement of ES technologies, the European Commission, 
within the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) has 
established the ARTEMIS-JU, a technological initiative in 
charge of defining and promoting a specific roadmap towards 
clear and focused objectives [1]. One of these objectives is the 
development of new technologies and/or strategies to address 
E2E Security in the context of ESs, with particular care to: 
- Solutions oriented to systems certification, 
- Cost reduction 
- Re-use and re-engineering of non-recurring solutions. 
In this context the authors, starting from their academic and 
industrial backgrounds, have conceived the SHIELD 
Framework ([2]), an architectural paradigm and design 
methodology able to address security aspects potentially in 
each and every domain where ESs (or networks of 
interconnected ESs) are deployed to provide specific services.  
As it happens for communication networks, where modular 
and cognitive architecture are adopted to provide flexible E2E 
services that dynamically satisfy the desired level of QoS (see 
[6]), similarly the interconnection of ESs may require the 
adoption of a modular and cognitive approach to provide E2E 
security functionalities that dynamically satisfy the desired 
“security level” form the end-user.  
Thus, the main novelty of the presented approach is the 
possibility of realizing a “known and predictable” E2E 
security behavior starting from the composition of individual, 
atomic elements. In spite of this, the main features of the 
proposed SHIELD framework are:  
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- modularity and expandability (i.e. the possibility of 
composing elements together),  
- cognitiveness and flexibility (i.e. the possibility of 
dynamically adapting to the specific context) 
- technology independence (i.e. the possibility of 
abstracting the controlled components in order to 
measure and provide security in any environment). 
The basic approach has already been presented in [2] as 
preliminary result of the pSHIELD research project ([11]); in 
this paper an improvement with respect to the basic approach 
is shown, mainly basing on the recent advances achieved in the 
execution of the nSHIELD project ([12]), which represents the 
second phase of the SHIELD Roadmap. 
In order to describe the SHIELD approach to E2E security, 
the rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the 
SHIELD methodology (as presented in [2]) is recalled and in 
Section 3 the SHIELD behavior as a closed-loop control 
system is depicted in detail. In Section 4 the innovative control 
approach to assure E2E security is then presented, and in 
Section 5 an example is provided. Finally in Section 6 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
II. THE SHIELD METHODOLOGY 
The main purpose of the SHIELD methodology is to 
provide an architectural solution and a design paradigm to 
enable the Composability of atomic (Security) functionalities 
in Complex Systems.  
 
 
A trivial representation is provided in Fig. 1. The SHIELD 
modules can be represented as pieces of a puzzle, which 
perfectly fits each other thanks to common interfaces. Each 
module implements a Security technology or a specific 
Security functionality. As an example, in Fig. 1 at node level 
there are two modules: Trusted Platform Module and Crypto 
Technology, at network level there are two functionalities: 
self-x algorithms and secure routing, and at middleware level 




These modules, belonging to different SPD layers (node, 
network or middleware), can be composed (i.e. activated, 
deactivated or configured) statically or dynamically by the 
SHIELD Security Agent, an innovative software agent (see [4] 
for details) that collects the information on the system and 
takes decisions according to proper control algorithms.  
This is possible thanks to the development of proper 
semantic models (as outlined in [3] and [5]) that allows the 
system description in a technology independent way (i.e. 
machine readable) as well as the definition of security metrics 
that allow the quantification of the security level and 
consequently the  
Thanks to the continuous monitoring performed by the 
Security Agent, individual SHIELD modules can be 
dynamically activated and reconfigured once the measured 
Security metrics do not satisfy the required Security levels, 
even at run-time.  
In addition modularity and technology-independence of the 
architecture allow a plug&play like behavior, suitable for any 
kind of application. 
In a more structured representation, in Fig. 2 the SHIELD 
reference architecture is depicted as a control scheme, with the 
indication of the actors involved in the measurements and 
commands exchange. The scheme is generically referred to as 
SPD functionalities, that means Security Privacy and 
Dependability, since the proposed approach allows to jointly 
address these peculiarities. However in the prosecution of the 
paper we will refer only to the “Security” aspects, for which 
the new metrics and the control algorithms are tailored. 
The core of the system, as previously introduced, is the 
Security Agent: each Agent monitors a set of properly selected 
measurements and parameters taken from the system (see the 
arrows labeled as measurements in Fig.2). These 
heterogeneous measurements and parameters are converted by 
the security agents in homogeneous/technology-independent) 
metadata by extensively using properly selected semantic 
technologies; the use of homogeneous metadata makes easy 
the metadata exchange among different security agent (see 
Fig.2). Each Security Agent, thanks to metadata homogeneity, 
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Fig. 2 SHIELD Architecture 
 
Fig. 1 SHIELD Methodology 




































Fig. 3 Composability: a closed-loop view 
information which form the so-called dynamic context on 
which the control decisions will be tailored.  
Last, but not least, in the security agent runs a set of control 
algorithms which are responsible of dynamically deciding 
which Security modules have to be composed (i.e. enabled/ 
disabled/configured) in order to achieve the desired Security 
level. The decision is driven by the computation of proper 
technology independent metrics, specifically designed for 
security applications. 
In the scope of end-to-end security (the focus subject of this 
paper), the strength of the SHIELD methodology is that is 
possible to derive an overall (or E2E) behaviour starting from 
the atomic behaviors of atomic components and adequately 
composing them according to proper rules and control 
algorithms. 
On a practical point of view, the SHIELD paradigm allows 
to deploy small devices (or to use the ones already available), 
interconnect them and, with the introduction of an intelligent 
software Agent, dynamically organizing and structuring them 
so that their capabilities are leveraged to jointly produce the 
desired effect. As an example, one may be interested in 
realising the secure monitoring of a train station:  
IF the devices deployed in the station (i.e. sensors, cameras, 
controllers, actuators, etc.) are SHIELD compliant  
AND IF at least one SHIELD Security Agent is introduced 
in this system 
THEN it is possible to activate the automatic composition 
and the system will automatically discover the available 
devices and the context information, quantify the security level 
according to the defined metrics, compute a control action and 
enforce it in the systems to activate/configure the sensors and 
cameras in the station so that the collected monitoring data are 
cyphered and made available only to authorized personnel.  
This is a trivial example, but is representative of what we 
call E2E security behaviour: each component is in charge of a 
specific functionality that is useful to reach the overall 
objective. 
 
III. THE SHIELD CLOSED-LOOP CONTROL APPROACH 
The problem of composing security functionalities can be 
successfully modelled by leveraging a control theoretic 
approach (see Fig. 3). Indeed, such kind of model is by far 
closer to the effective implementation of the SHIELD system. 
The reference signal is the desired security level, obtained 
and quantified according to the SHIELD metrics (that will be 
presented in the following section). 
This signal is then used by the Controller, that is able to 
elaborate decision according to proper control algorithms as 
well as through the interaction with a secondary Context 
Controller that translates ancillary information on the system 
into constraints and parameters relevant for security purposes. 
A secondary reference signal may be applied to the system, if, 
apart from the E2E security behavior, it is also of importance 
to control other parameters not relevant for security. 
In [2] a control algorithm based on Common Criteria 
composition engine enriched with Hybrid Automata and 
Model Predictive Control optimization have been proposed as 
preliminary instantiation of such architecture. This approach 
has been conceived to be fully in line with the concepts being 
developed in similar context (e.g. the Future Internet 
framework [3]) where the limitations coming from the lack of 
coordination among elements belonging to different layers 
and/or heterogeneous environments, are addressed through the 
design of modular controllers and multi-objective procedures. 




This solution proved to be valid, but less effective for 
complex implementations mainly due to the effort needed to 
translate the “information” into semantic models. The 
nSHIELD research has then lead to the definition of a new, 
simpler and more efficient approach, based on these pillars: 
- A new metric has been introduced, based on the concept 
of “attack-surface”, that enables an ease abstraction 
with respect to the underlying technologies. 
- The Common Criteria (CC) guidelines have been 
confirmed, since the satisfaction of security properties 
must base its foundations on a consolidated standard, 
and embedded in the new metrics 
- The control algorithm has become the translation of the 
metrics into an optimization problem, whose objective 
is to find the elements that maximize a target function  
 
IV. INNOVATIVE CONTROL APPROACH TO E2E SECURITY 
The main novelty of this approach is the definition of 
“attack surface”, i.e. a virtual line that surrounds a system and 
by which is possible to identify the potential menaces or 
vulnerabilities that affect the security level. When composing 
two or more elements, the attack surface is updated and the 
new menaces/vulnerabilities are updated as well. Once the 
final shape of the system is achieved, the resulting surface is 
the starting point to perform control. As anticipated before, the 
innovative approach to compose atomic functionalities to 
achieve E2E security, is based on the two most important 
standards in cyber-security: Common Criteria (CC, [8]) and 
Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual 
(OSSTMM, [9]).  
The OSSTMM “is a methodology to test the operational 
security of physical locations, human interactions, and all 
forms of communications such as wireless, wired, analog, and 
digital”[9]. It is based on the concept of control that is the 
mean to influence the impact of threats and their effects when 
interaction is required. Controls are divided in two categories: 
- Interactive Controls, which are able to directly 
influence visibility, access, or trust interactions and this 
set includes Authentication, Indemnification, Resilience, 
Subjugation and Continuity 
- Process Controls, which do not influence the interactions 
but they are used to create the defensive processes. They 
are Non-repudiation, Confidentially, Privacy, Integrity 
and Alarm. 
The activation of a single or a multiple control may 
originate undesirable effects on the attack surface of the 
system (i.e. the set of interfaces and vulnerabilities that affect 
the . The OSSTMM models this element through the 
Limitation concept, which denotes the inability of a control to 
protect a part of the system. The Limitation value is given by 
the capabilities of the system and the controls in terms of 
Vulnerability, Weakness, Concern, Exposure and Anomaly. 
Fig. 4 shows how the Limitations are mapped with respect to 
the system and the controls. 
In the nSHIELD approach hereby presented, we have 
improved the OSSTMM standard by considering an attack 
surface described through the Common Criteria. In particular it 
has been defined the Damage Effort Ratio (DER) as the ratio 
between the “Damage Potential” and the “Effort” values for 
each interface, thus obtaining a numerical indicator of the 
damage that can be caused to the system if a malicious access 
occurs in this interface. This is a way to measure the “surface” 
without a-priori knowledge about the system. 
 
 
As an example, we could consider an interface in which it is 
possible to access with three different privileges and three 
different access rights as in Tab. 1: an interface with “root” 
privilege and “admin” right has DER=1, WHILE an 




Considering the inclusion of CC in the OSSTMM standard, 
the control scheme presented in Fig. 3 is instantiated as 
depicted in Figure 5:  
- the main controller is based on an optimization function 
that tries to minimize the vulnerability of the attack 
surface by activating functionalities 
- The Context Aware controller has become the OSSTMM 
controller, since it uses context information to provide 
the list of Interactive/Process Controls that the main 
controller may put in place to cope with the security 
needs. 
In addition, the influence of Policy Management (that in [2] 
has been modelled as a disturb) has become a “controllable” 
input for the context controller, that considers Policies as 
constraints to the Interactive/Process controls that it can put in 
place. 
. 
Method Privilege Value Access Rights Value 
root 4 admin 4 
debugger 3 authenticated 3 
authenticated 2 anonymous 2 
Tab 1.Example of DER 
 
Fig. 4 Limitations effects 





From the mathematical point of view, the main controller 
solves a typical optimal control problem where the objective 
function is the minimization of Security value and the 
constraints is given by the OSSTMM-CC standards and by the 
policy management system. Higher values of Security cause 
the activation of more controls and countermeasures; this is the 
reason why the optimal problem minimizes the Security value. 
In particular, it minimizes the ΔSPD (i.e. security) value, which 
is the difference between the desired and actual SPD values. 
 
V. EXAMPLE OF THE NEW SHIELD APPROACH 
The example by which the proposed methodology has been 
tested is an improvement of the one presented in [2] as final 
demonstration of the pSHIELD project, i.e. the “Monitoring of 
freight trains transporting hazardous material”. 
The hypothesized platform is composed by a central unit 
connected by means of a ciphered wireless network to remote 
sensors. In this platform the assets to protect are data sent by 
remote sensors to central unit, where data are recorded inside 
the central unit itself. 
Threats identified for the above scenario are the following: 
- Unauthorized disclosure of information stored within or 
communicated through computers or communications 
systems; 
- Unauthorized modification or destruction of stored 
information; 
- Manipulation of computer or telecommunications 
services resulting in various violations; 
- Propagation of false or misleading information; 
- Users lacking guidance or security awareness; 
- Data entry or utilization error; 
- Faulty access rights management; 
Security functionalities (i.e. Controls) that counter the above 
threats belong to the following categories: 
- Authentication; 
- Confidentiality; 
- Non repudiation; 
- Subjugation. 
The application of the surface Attach metrics approach does 
not depend on a thorough knowledge of the theory that 
generates such an approach, but only by a well-established 
knowledge that the supplier of the system and/or components 
of a system must have on security issues. 
Starting from the previously evidenced threats, for each of 
the two components the attack surface value must be 
computed, according to the guidelines provided in [8] and [9].  
The values for the components of the sample scenario are: 
- Central unit: 88,75 
Constant due to the lack of controls that could be 
implemented 
- Wireless Sensor Network: [84,089 93,340] 
Depending on which of the two available controls is 
activated. In fact it is important to consider that the different 
choice of key management and Cryptographic operation 
algorithm change the vulnerability type, so it insert the 
possibility, changing these algorithm to modify the Security 
level of the component introducing different states.  
In this case the formulation of an Optimization function is 
not needed, since it is evident that the most robust 
configuration is the one associated to a 93,340 value for the 
WSN. However, in case the available controls and their 
combination is very high, it is sufficient to maximize the 
Optimization function given by the sum of the atomic security 
value, within the constraints defined by policies (i.e. mutual 
inclusion or mutual exclusions of controls).  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper the innovative results achieved by the 
nSHIELD project have been presented, as a significant 
improvement of the proof of concept reported in [2]. In 
particular it has been shown how it is possible to drive an E2E 
behavior by acting on the atomic elements; the key idea is to 
describe each component with a clear and univocally defined 
metric value that measure the vulnerability of its attack surface 
(derived as a mix of [8] and [9] guidelines). Then, while 
composing together several elements, the resulting attack 
surface is obtained as the result of an optimization problem 
whose potential solutions are the different controls that the 
atomic elements can put in place to countermeasure specific 
menaces. The problem may be solved by exploration or 
through simple heuristics.  
The proposed methodology is currently being intensively 
tested in industrially relevant scenarios from the avionic and 
railways domains and the results will be made available in the 
final nSHIELD project deliverables. 
Future works foresee the adaptation of the proposed 
approach to address also other problems. It could be 
particularly helpful, for example, in scenarios where the 
topologies change very often and the E2E behavior is the 
provisioning of a specific service, like power distribution (see 
[10]). The main challenge will be the adaptation/tailoring of a 
proper metric to the new domain, since a good metric is the 
basis of any SHIELD-like methodology. 
 
Fig. 5 Innovative Controller 
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